Noninterference measurement quantifies the secret information that might leak to an adversary from what the adversary can observe and influence about the computation. Static and high-fidelity noninterference measurement has been difficult to scale to complex computations, however. This paper scales a recent framework for noninterference measurement to the open-source RISC-V BOOM core as specified in Verilog, through three key innovations: logically characterizing the core's execution incrementally, applying specific optimizations between each cycle; permitting information to be declassified, to focus leakage measurement to only secret information that cannot be inferred from the declassified information; and interpreting leakage measurements for the analyst in terms of simple rules that characterize when leakage occurs. Case studies on cache-based side channels generally, and on specific instances including \textsc{Spectre} attacks, show that the resulting toolchain, called \textsc{DINoMe}, effectively scales to this modern processor design.